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31 July 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
East Asia Division, DDO

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: "'The Vietnamese Leadership and the
Indochina Crisis of 1979'--A Dissenting
View," Contra, June 1979

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1. I read and enjoyed your dissenting view on the NFAC analysis of the Vietnamese situation. I think there is a lot of merit in saying that the Vietnamese view their position over the last 18 months in a favorable light. My only hesitation is on whether they really gauged what they were going to get into in Kampuchea. I don't question your thesis that they thought it out and planned it rather than doing it on the spur of the moment. Why, however, they would get themselves bogged down in a protracted guerrilla war I am not sure. I suppose that if Pol Pot holds up in the next four or five months it may be that they calculated quite correctly. On the other hand, if he can drag on for years, do they really want to get bogged down in a guerrilla war, and should they not have been able to anticipate this considering all the experience they have had? Perhaps your point is simply that they are patient and willing to sacrifice, and playing in Kampuchea the role that was the American role in Vietnam may not daunt them since they assume they will come out better than we did.

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2. Thanks in any event for stimulating us with your contribution to Contra.

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STANSFIELD TURNER

cc: Editor, Contra.

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